Semiotics experiences its youthfulness. Accordingly, our part is pleasure and pain, ours an era of fascinating insights and discoveries in semiotics -as well as changes in views, or hard work and tiresome discussions. No concept is protected against reinterpretation.
Habit is a fundamental concept for semiotics; at least the development of semiotics demonstrates it is becoming one. It already was one in the thought of Peirce, 5 and for that reason an inquiry into his work is a signifi cant part of semiotics.
Th e development of the concept of habit has much to teach to us. 6 For instance, it was important in the discussions of evolution and development in Peirce's times. Speaking of the Law of Habit, Joseph John Murphy, in Habit and Intelligence, says that "all vital actions whatever tend to repeat themselves, and consequently to become habitual"; he also speaks about three main types of habits: formative, motor, and mental habits, mentioning that "the law of mental habit is usually called the law of association of ideas" (Murphy 1869: 48 (Morgan 1896: 17) . Or, as Samuel Butler observes in Life and Habit, "unconscious knowledge and unconscious volition are never acquired otherwise than as a result of experience, familiarity, or habit" (Butler 1878: 18) . James Mark Baldwin (1906: 452) adds, concerning an organism's development, " [F] irst, it develops by getting habits formed; and second, it develops by getting new adaptations which involve the breaking up or modifi cation of habits -these latter being called accommodations". In Peirce's system, habit takes a most fundamental place. All these scholars were important as regards the formation of the understanding of evolution on the basis of 'organic selection' , or 'the Baldwinian mechanism' , that today is known as a part of the Post-Darwinian, or epigenetic account of organic evolution. 7 And this is not all. When the social aspect of habit is brought into a focus, a line of development of this concept appears which leads from Peirce's habit via Erwin Panofsky to Pierre Bourdieu's habitus (see Viola 2012) . 8 Yet another dimension of habit is related to moral decisions and ethics (see, e.g., Colapietro 2011).
How is diversifi cation possible in the world? Th is was one of the central problems Peirce attempted to solve. However, it appears to have been a little too early for a scientifi cally well-argued answer to be formulated. Anyhow, modelling of habit is a 5 Cf. Pietarinen (2015: 378) : "It turns out that at least experience and habit, two cornerstones of Peirce's thought, do not fall under the umbrella of signs. Every sign has its representative quality, its meaning. Meaning, in turn, is a habit, and it is derived from experience. " 6 E.g, the use of the concept of habit already by David Hume, or in later psychology (Roeckelein 1998: 224-225). constituent of the problem of diversifi cation. Th eoretical semiotics has a long way to go, and this is kept in mind in the formulations that follow.
The semiotic concept of habit
Habits are regularities that are products of semiosis. Any habit is a regularity produced by semiosis. Th e process involved in habit-change is learning. Learning modifi es habits and establishes new ones. Habits presuppose learning. Th us habits carry on one's experience.
Semiotics is a fundamental fi eld of (study of) knowing -and habits are necessary for any knowing. Even more -as Peirce said, "knowledge is habit" (CP 4.531).
Jaakko Hintikka (2007: 17) added, "Surely the fi rst order of business of any genuine theory of knowledge -the most important task both theoretically and practicallyis how new [knowledge can be] acquired, not merely how previously obtained information can be evaluated".
As Erkki Kilpinen (2015: 160) has said, habits are "vehicles of cognition". With a reference to John Dewey, Kilpinen (2015: 160) also states that "intentionality without habituality is empty, habituality without intentionality is blind". 9 What exactly is the relationship between semiosis and habit? Or rather, in the plural -semioses and habits (since sign is never single). Do habits include semioses or does semiosis always precede habit?
Th e formula 'habits -semioses -habits' can be used as a simple representation of the dynamic relationship. Semiosis occurs due to certain incompatibility in the interaction of habits, thus it requires habits. As a result of semioses, habits will change, or new habits appear.
It is reasonable to hypothesize that semiosis takes place only in a phenomenal present (in specious present, as William James used the term). 10 Or rather semiosis creates the phenomenal present, the now. (We can even say that semiosis is the phenomenal now.) Th is is because interpretation assumes a possibility for choice (between options), while choice truly cannot happen in a sequentionality, it presumes presence and the present. In this aspect, semiosis is a choice between habits. Habits themselves are sequential behaviours.
Habits are inferences carried out by life far before logic becomes conscious or formal. Not only is habit repeated (almost automatic) behaviour; habit may also be repeated semiosis. Cf. Dewey (1922: 67) : "Th ought which does not exist within ordinary habits of action lacks means of execution". Cf. also comments in Glăveanu 2014 about 'habitual creativity' . 10 More on this in Kull 2015. Th e regularity of habits is based on scaff oldings (Hoff meyer 2014). Th e scaff oldings, however, are modifi ed by habits themselves.
Habit is always a construing. Th us, it is a basis for creativity (Glăveanu 2014) . Almost paradoxically, the force of habit works as vis vitalis.
Consensus on Peirce's concept of habit?
Donna West and Myrdene Anderson have compiled and edited a book that can be described as a collective monograph on, and also a companion to, the Peircean approach to the phenomenon of habit. As far as I know, this book constitutes the fi rst treatment of Peirce's unique concept of habit.
Th e editors of this volume are professional semioticians whose impact on contemporary semiotics has been remarkable (e.g., Anderson et al. 1984; 2003; Adams, Anderson 1994; Anderson, Merrell 1991; Anderson 2004 Anderson , 2016a West 2014) . Th ey have done marvellous work in carefully uniting the eff orts of 27 semioticians from 12 countries: USA (7) From its title, Consensus on Peirce's Concept of Habit, one may assume that the volume assuredly states the consolidation and settledness of Peirce's approach in semiotics. Indeed, one can say that the last decade has shown the possibility of arriving at a productive agreement in the interpretation of the core of Peirce's theory (in this respect I would particularly like to emphasize the work of Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Francesco Bellucci, Nathan Houser, Vincent Colapietro) . Th is impression should be still kept apart from an association with a fi nal consensus that is obviously impossible in case of Peirce.
Th e book is rich in fresh ideas and fi ne formulations. For illustration, a few hints in the form of quotations.
Myrdene Anderson (2016b: 8) : "Understanding "self " as a manifestation of a bundle of habits, implicates "self-control" as a player. It happens that contemporary research in the social and behavioural sciences seems to back into the study of selfcontrol, though seldom via Peirce's insights. [...] Probably no single angle of habit will turn out to be so signifi cant to the contemporary world as self-control. " Indeed, the topic of self-control is discussed in the papers by Gorlée, Nöth, Gustafsson and Pietarinen, Santaella, Bergman, Kilpinen, West, Stjernfelt. Pietarinen and Bellucci, Colapietro, Cannizzaro and Anderson, in Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Francesco Bellucci (2016: 265) : "Th e logical representative interpretant is a principle not itself a premise, a rule not itself subject to rules, a habit not itself a sign. " A habit may not be a sign.
It is important to keep the concept of habit separated from the concept of physical law. Habit is a locally acquired regularity, a rule of behaviour with its exceptions. By defi nition, a physical law is, in contrast, universal, without exceptions, not acquired.
Th e excellent volume by Donna West and Myrdene Anderson about the concept of habit is a part of the collective work on the conceptual apparatus of semiotics that semiotic science systematically has to engage in and accomplish.
